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Abstract
This study investigates the effects of attentional control on the hemispheric
processing of predictive inferences during reading. Participants read texts that were either
strongly or weakly constrained towards a predictive inference and performed a lexical
decision task to inference-related target words presented to the right or left visual field—
hemisphere. Facilitation for strongly constrained predictive inferences was greater than
facilitation for weakly constrained predictive inferences in both hemispheres. Readers
with high attentional control showed significant facilitation for strongly constrained
inferences in the both hemispheres, but only showed significant facilitation for weakly
constrained inferences in the left hemisphere. Readers with low attentional control did
not show significant facilitation in any of the conditions. These results suggest that
readers with high attentional control may have an advantage for generating predictive
inferences during reading, a skill which could contribute to improved situation model
construction and comprehension compared to readers with low attentional control.
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INTRODUCTION
Successful reading comprehension relies on the ability to generate connections
(i.e., inferences) about information presented in a text. Previous research has shown that
certain types of inferences (e.g., coherence or bridging inferences) are necessary for
understanding a text as they establish connections between what the reader is currently
processing and information that they have encountered previously in a text (Graessar,
Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). For example, in the passage “The man threw the vase against
the wall. It cost over $100 to replace,” the reader must refer back to the first sentence to
understand that the vase broke. By contrast, predictive inferences (i.e., predictions about
what will occur next in a text) are often considered to be elaborative and optional
(Allbritton, 2004; Casteel, 2007). For example, after reading the sentence, “The couple
were just pronounced as man and wife” one will likely make a prediction that the couple
will kiss, but this prediction may not be necessary to comprehend subsequent information
in the text. Thus, predictive inferences are not as crucial to text comprehension as
bridging or coherence inferences.
Despite being optional during text comprehension, research has shown that
predictive inferences can help readers build situation models (i.e., mental representations
of the situations conveyed by words and sentences in a text) (Zwaan, Magliano, &
Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998) and improve comprehension (FincherKiefer, 1993). Further, research has shown that predictive inferences can lead to easier
processing of future texts events (van den Broek, 1990). However, generating predictive
inferences is costly in terms of cognitive processing and thus requires ample resources in
working memory (i.e., the ability to store and process information simultaneously), which
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may not be available to all readers during text comprehension (Baddeley, 1983;
Linderholm, 2002; Virtue, van den Broek, & Linderholm, 2006). Specifically, research
has suggested that readers with low working memory capacity (WMC) rarely make
predictive inferences during reading, which suggests that predictive inferences may only
be available to readers with access to a certain amount of working memory resources
(Linderholm, 2002). Thus, working memory contributes to predictive inference
generation during reading.
The availability of predictive inferences during reading has also been shown to
vary based on the level of causal constraint (i.e., the likelihood that future events will take
place) in a text. Readers are less likely to generate predictive inferences after reading
weakly constrained texts versus strongly constrained texts (Linderholm, 2002; Virtue, et
al., 2006). For example, compared to the previous example of the couple being
pronounced husband and wife (i.e., a strongly constrained text), a reader would be less
likely to generate the predictive inference that the two characters would kiss if they had
been presented with the sentence “The students had just been announced as college
graduates” (i.e., a weakly constrained text) (Virtue et al., 2006). In sum, causal constraint
can influence the likelihood that a reader will generate a predictive inference during
reading.
The neural mechanisms that underlie predictive inference generation have also
been shown to vary based on textual constraint and working memory capacity.
Specifically, high working memory capacity readers have been shown to exhibit greater
facilitation for strongly constrained inferences than weakly constrained inferences in both
hemispheres while low working memory capacity readers show the same pattern in the
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left hemisphere but show higher facilitation for weakly constrained inferences than for
strongly constrained inferences in the right hemisphere (Virtue et al., 2006). These
findings suggest that readers with low working memory capacity are less likely to inhibit
weakly constrained predictions in the right hemisphere than readers with high working
memory capacity.
Recent research has identified attentional control (i.e., the ability to fixate
attention on a task and resist interference from task-irrelevant stimuli) as a crucial
element of working memory (Unsworth & Spillers, 2010; McVay & Kane, 2012).
Attentional control—which can be measured using a go/no-go task called the Sustained
Attention to Response Task (SART)—influences goal-maintenance processes (i.e.,
processes that guide attention toward task-relevant information) during reading by
facilitating access to information in a text while minimizing interference from
distractions (e.g., environmental interference, habitual behaviors, task irrelevant
thoughts) (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; McVay & Kane, 2012). While research has
provided insights into influence of WMC on predictive inference generation, research has
yet to investigate the specific role that attentional control could play in this process.
Investigating this topic can provide a better understanding of the attention-specific
mechanisms that underlie previously observed differences in predictive inference
generation as a factor of WMC. Specifically, comparing findings from investigations of
WMC and predictive inference generation with findings from an investigation of
attentional control and predictive inference generation could provide insight into the
specific influence that attentional control has on a reader’s ability to make predictions
about what will occur next in a text. Thus, the present study investigates how attentional
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control affects predictive inference generation in the hemispheres during reading as a
function of textual constraint.
The following sections provide a theoretical overview for the present study,
including a discussion of predictive inferences and a review of previous research on
hemispheric processing of predictive inferences. This is followed by a discussion of
previous research on the influence of textual constraint and working memory on
predictive inference generation and a review of relevant research on the effects of
attentional control on text comprehension in the hemispheres during reading.
Attributional Research
Predictive Inferences
Broadly speaking, inferences can be divided into two primary categories:
backward inferences and forward inferences (Fincher-Kiefer, 1995; Virtue et al., 2006a).
Bridging inferences (i.e., backward inferences) allow readers to connect new information
in a text with information mentioned earlier in a text (van den Broek, 1990; Virtue et al.,
2006a). For example, in the passage, “The man threw the vase against the wall. It cost
over one hundred dollars to replace,” the second sentence creates a coherence break (i.e.,
an interruption to the logical flow of the narrative) and, thus, a bridging inference is
necessary to understand that the vase mentioned in the first sentence was broken after it
was thrown against the wall. Bridging inferences allow readers to combine background
knowledge (e.g., knowing what happens to fragile objects when they are thrown against
hard surfaces) with contextual information (e.g., the fact that the vase had to be replaced)
to resolve contradictions created by coherence breaks and, thus, to understand what is
occurring in a text (Graessar, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; Beeman, Bowden, &
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Gernsbacher, 2000). Thus, backward inferences are necessary for comprehension because
they allow readers to draw connections between the information that they are currently
reading and the information that was previously mentioned to create a more detailed
representation of a text.
Predictive inferences (i.e., forward inferences) allow readers to anticipate what
will happen next in a text (van den Broek, 1990). For example, after reading the sentence,
“The minister just pronounced the couple husband and wife,” it is likely that a reader will
infer, based on their background knowledge of wedding ceremonies, that the couple will
kiss (Virtue et al., 2006). According to the Construction-Integration model (Kintsch,
1988), readers generate inferences by making connections between multiple events and
ideas in a text and integrating those connections with their background knowledge to
construct a macro-level representation of a text (i.e., situation model). This model
suggests that readers automatically activate predictive inferences during reading to
comprehend a text.
Some research has provided support for the Construction-Integration model with
regard to inferences by showing the advantages that predictive inference generation
provides for text comprehension. For example, predictive inferences can lead to easier
processing of future text events by allowing readers to anticipate what will happen next
and proceed more quickly to subsequent text events when those predictions are confirmed
(van den Broek, 1990). Predictive inferences have also been found to help readers make
causal connections between events in a text (Fincher-Kiefer, 1993). Specifically,
predictive inferences have been shown to improve readers’ ability to construct situation
models of narratives during reading, which leads to improved comprehension of a text
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(Fincher-Kiefer, 1993). Further, some research has suggested that certain types of
predictive inferences (e.g., high-predictability inferences) are necessary for text
comprehension (Klin, Murray, Levine, & Guzman, 1999). Thus, predictive inferences
may provide important advantages to readers during text comprehension.
However, research has been inconclusive as to whether or not readers routinely
and automatically generate predictive inferences during reading (Campion, 2004). The
Minimalist Hypothesis posits that only locally coherent (i.e., sentence level) inferences,
which are necessary for comprehension, are routinely activated during text
comprehension (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). A related theory called the Constructionist
Theory, posits that globally coherent (i.e., inferences that contribute to a reader’s overall
understanding of a text) are also activated automatically during reading (Graessar, Singer,
& Trabasso, 1993). Several studies have provided support for the Minimalist Hypothesis
and Constructionist Theory with regard to predictive inference generation by showing
that predictive inferences are not routinely activated during reading, despite being
available under certain optimal conditions (e.g. when story context strongly supports
predictive inference generation) (Weingarten, Guzman, Levine, & Klin, 2003; Campion,
2004; Casteel, 2007). As a result, predictive inferences are often considered to be
optional and elaborative rather than automatic and critical for comprehension.
Predictive inferences have also been shown to be cognitively demanding
(Linderholm, 2002). That is, predicting future text events requires cognitive resources
that go above and beyond simply encoding and processing current text events. As such,
predictive inferences tend to be generated more often by readers who score highly on
measures of reading comprehension (e.g., the Nelson Denny Reading Test) than by
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readers who score poorly on measures of reading comprehension (Murray & Burke,
2003). According to the Causal Inference Process model, predictive inference generation
relies on the interplay between activation of explicitly stated and associated concepts in
long-term memory being transferred into working memory (van den Broek, 1994). Thus,
predictive inferences require a minimum amount of activation of inference-related
concepts to be successfully generated.
In sum, predictive inferences allow readers to make predictions about future text
events and have been shown to improve comprehension, but readers do not routinely
generate predictive inferences during reading. Further, research has shown that predictive
inferences are cognitively demanding and that the ability to generate predictive
inferences during reading varies based on reading skill. To better understand the
processes that underlie predictive inference generation, research has investigated how
predictive inferences are processed in each hemisphere of the brain.
Inferential Processing in the Hemispheres
Research on the hemispheric processing of predictive inferences has provided
insight into the specific neural mechanisms that underlie inferential processing in the
brain. Specifically, research has provided support for the right hemisphere’s role in
inferential processing during reading. Brownell, Potter, Bihrle, & Gardner (1986) found
that patients with right hemisphere lesions were severely impaired in their ability to draw
inferences. Specifically, right-hemisphere-damaged patients were unable to successfully
answer true or false questions about information that was not explicitly mentioned in a
text (i.e., information requiring a bridging inference) despite being able to correctly
answer questions about explicitly stated information (Brownell et al., 1986). Subsequent
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research, which used lexical decision tasks to test inference generation in right
hemisphere-damaged patients after they read narratives containing multiple passages,
also found evidence to support the right hemisphere’s role in inferential processing
(Beeman, 1993). These early investigations suggested that neurological structures in the
right hemisphere were crucial for inferring information during text processing.
Subsequent studies have provided a more nuanced understanding of the right
hemisphere’s role in predictive inference processing. For instance, research on healthy
participants has indicated that the right hemisphere is more sensitive to priming
predictive (i.e., forward) inferences while the left hemisphere is more sensitive to priming
coherence (i.e. bridging/backward) inferences (Beeman, Bowden, & Gernsbacher, 2000).
Patients with right hemisphere damage have been shown to be less able to maintain
predictive inferences over time than healthy individuals (Lehman-Blake & Tompkins,
2001). Further, patients with right hemisphere brain damage have been found to display
difficulty generating predictive inferences based on contextual details compared to
individuals without brain damage (Lehman-Blake & Lesniewicz, 2005). For example,
when presented with the sentence “The man threw the vase against the wall,” patients
with right hemisphere damage are less likely than healthy participants to use the sentence
context to activate the correct inference meaning (i.e., BREAK). fMRI studies have
shown that while predictive inferences are constructed in the left inferior frontal gyrus,
the right lingual gyrus is responsible for integrating predictive inferences into a reader’s
representation of a text (Jin, Liu, Fang, Zhang, & Lin, 2009). Taken together, these
findings suggest that the right hemisphere is involved in the processing of predictive
inferences during reading.
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Textual Constraint
One factor that has been shown to influence the hemispheric processing of
predictive inferences is textual constraint. Research has shown that the level of textual
constraint—that is, how strongly text events point to a particular word or event—can
affect activation in the cerebral hemispheres during inference generation (Virtue, van den
Broek, & Linderholm, 2006a). Specifically, both hemispheres have been found to
facilitate the process of generating strongly constrained inferences (Virtue et al., 2006).
However, the right hemisphere has been found to display a distinct advantage for
processing weakly constrained inferences (Virtue et al., 2006). For example, activation
for the inference “kiss” is more likely to occur in the right hemisphere after reading the
sentence “The students had just been announced as college graduates” than in the left
hemisphere (Virtue et al., 2006). In sum, while both hemispheres have been found to
facilitate strongly constrained inferences, research suggests that the right hemisphere is
uniquely involved in the processing of weakly constrained inferences.
Beeman’s Fine Coarse Semantic Coding theory provides an explanation for
patterns of hemispheric activity observed during inferential processing at varying levels
of constraint (Beeman, Friedman, Grafman, Perez, Diamond, & Lindsay, 1994). This
theory proposes that the left hemisphere—which contains more densely-packed neural
structures than the right hemisphere—specializes in activating a limited set of strongly
related associations (i.e., fine semantic coding) that are closely related to a given word
during reading (Beeman et al., 1994). In contrast, the right hemisphere—which contains
more loosely packed neural structures than the left hemisphere—specializes in the
generation of broad, loosely correlated associations during reading (i.e., coarse coding)
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(Beeman et al., 1994; Beeman, Bowden, & Gernsbacher, 2000). For example, after being
presented with the word “bee,” the left hemisphere would be more likely to generate
closely-related semantic associations such as “honey” or “sting,” whereas the right
hemisphere would be more likely to generate loosely related semantic associations such
as “pollen” or “fly” (Beeman, Bowden, & Gernsbacher, 2000). Thus, the right
hemisphere’s role in facilitating weakly constrained inferences is likely a product of its
advantage for coarse coding of distantly related associations. As such, weakly
constrained (i.e., coarsely associated) predictive inferences rely more on the looser neural
connections of the right hemisphere than strongly constrained predictive inferences.
Working Memory Capacity
Along with textual constraint, another factor that has been found to influence the
generation and hemispheric processing of predictive inferences is working memory
capacity. One of the most widely studied factors that influences inference generation
during reading is working memory capacity (WMC) (i.e., the ability to store and
manipulate multiple pieces of information at the same time) (Baddeley, 1983). Early
research investigating the connection between inference processing and WMC found that
individuals with high WMCs exhibited faster generation of bridging inferences and more
efficient access to relevant knowledge than individuals with low WMCs (Singer &
Ritchot, 1996). Researchers posited that the elevated inference and comprehension levels
observed in high WMC readers were a result of a qualitatively different reading style that
was better suited for efficiently integrating world knowledge and constructing situational
models during reading (Dixon, LeFevre, & Twilley, 1988; Singer & Ritchot, 1996). In
sum, differences in WMC have been found to explain much of the variance in readers’
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ability to successfully generate inferences during reading.
Research has also investigated the mechanisms involved with these WMC-related
differences in reading comprehension. Daneman & Carpenter (1983) found that
individuals with low WMC have pronounced difficulties with integrating information
(i.e., making connections between text events) and resolving lexical ambiguity (i.e.,
deciding on the appropriate interpretation of a word meaning when multiple
interpretations are available) during reading. According to the Capacity Constrained
Comprehension (CCC) theory, cognitively demanding reading tasks (e.g., reading a
sentence that contains a complex structure or generating a predictive inference) require a
certain amount of available cognitive resources in order to be successfully comprehended
(Just & Carpenter, 1992). With regard to predictive inferences, research has supported
the CCC theory by showing that often only readers with high WMC possess enough
available cognitive resources to activate inference-related concepts from LTM whereas
low WMC readers do not (Linderholm, 2002). Thus, WMC can directly affect a reader’s
ability to successfully generate predictive inferences during reading by influencing
whether or not a reader has enough expendable cognitive resources available to activate
the concepts necessary to generate a specific inference.
Further research has investigated how inferential processing is manifested in the
hemispheres of individuals with high and low WMC. Virtue, van den Broek, &
Linderholm (2006) had participants read texts that promoted strongly or weakly
constrained inferences and performed a lexical decision task (i.e., word/non-word
judgment) in response to inference-related and neutral target words presented to either the
right visual field-left hemisphere (RVF-LH) or the left visual field-right hemisphere
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(LVF-RH). With regard to predictive inferences, their results indicated that readers with
high WMC showed greater facilitation (i.e., response time to inference-related target
words compared to neutral words) for strongly constrained inferences than for weakly
constrained inferences in the both the left and right hemisphere (Virtue et al., 2006a).
Conversely, low WMC readers exhibited an identical pattern in the left hemisphere but
showed greater facilitation for weakly constrained inferences in the right hemisphere
(Virtue et al., 2006). The researchers interpreted this hemispheric asymmetry as
indicating a deficit in inhibiting the activation of less constrained and less contextually
relevant potential outcomes on the part of low WMC readers (Virtue et al., 2006). In sum,
research has shown that WMC influences reading comprehension and predictive
inference generation in the hemispheres as a function of textual constraint.
Attentional Control
Subsequent research has attempted to disentangle the mechanisms that underlie
WMC and has suggested that one of its key components is attentional control (Unsworth
& Spillers, 2010; McVay & Kane, 2012). The ability to keep one’s attention fixated on a
task and resist interference from task-irrelevant stimuli has been found to reflect
individual differences in WMC (Borella, Ludwig, Fagot, & De Ribaupierre, 2011;
Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012). According to the Executive-Attention view of
WMC, the relation between WMC and reading comprehension is driven by overlapping,
domain-general attentional-control mechanisms (Engle & Kane, 2004). That is, the
attentional control mechanisms that are used for sustaining attention are thought to be the
same regardless of the task or stimulus (Engle & Kane, 2004). The Executive-Attention
view of WMC also posits that the act of paying attention during reading is governed by
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the same attentional control mechanisms as those used in previous, non-lexically-based
studies of attention and WMC. Thus, measuring an individual’s capacity to sustain their
attention on simple stimuli (e.g., a number or a word) can provide valuable insight into
their ability to pay attention during reading.
The Executive-Attention view holds that there are two primary components that
comprise WMC: goal maintenance and competition resolution (Engle & Kane, 2004;
McVay & Kane, 2012). Goal maintenance guides attention toward task-relevant
information and provides a mechanism for sustaining attention in the face of distractions
(e.g., environmental interference, irrelevant thoughts, or mind wandering) (McVay &
Kane, 2012). By contrast, competition resolution provides a mechanism for overcoming
moment-by-moment interference from goal irrelevant stimuli (McVay & Kane, 2012).
Researchers have contrasted these dual components of attention as being “proactive”
versus “reactive” processes, respectively (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007). That is, the
proactive process of goal maintenance is initiated prior to task performance in order to
maintain attention on a desired stimulus or action and minimize experiences of conflict
from outside distractions (Braver et al., 2007). By contrast, the reactive process of
competition resolution is initiated in the moment as a response to an attentional conflict
(i.e., interference from habit, environmental distractors, or irrelevant thoughts) (Braver et
al., 2007). Engle and Kane (2004) explained these two factors of executive control using
results from an antisaccade task, a task in which participants are instructed to make a
controlled eye movement in the opposite direction of a presented stimulus. Goal
maintenance facilitates a participants’ ability to keep the task goal (i.e., to look away
from the presented stimulus) in active memory whereas competition resolution resolves

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

21

the conflict between the current task goal and prepotent or habitual behaviors (i.e., the
reflex to look at the presented stimulus) (Engle & Kane, 2004). While reading a text,
goal maintenance is the process that allows a reader to maintain their focus on
comprehending the content they are reading whereas competition resolution allows a
reader resolve attentional conflicts and prevent activation of irrelevant information. In
this way, goal maintenance is the mechanism for directing and sustaining attention on a
task. Competition resolution, on the other hand, is the mechanism by which distractions
and irrelevant information is inhibited.
Research on attentional control during text comprehension has suggested that
attentional control primarily contributes to the goal maintenance component of WMC as
it allows readers to sustain attention during text comprehension (McVay & Kane, 2012).
Using the antisaccade task, research by Engle & Kane (2004) showed that participants
with high WMC were better able to direct their attention away from a presented stimulus
than participants with low WMC. Further research by Molenberghs, Gillebert, Schoofs,
Dupont, Peeters, and Vandenberghe (2009) found that commission errors (i.e., errors in a
go/no-go paradigm associated with incorrectly responding to a no-go trial) were
associated with fluctuations in sustained attention. Research has postulated that
commission errors may arise from a switch to automatic processing, which affects goal
maintenance in such a way that subjects are not able to inhibit a pre-potent go response in
a no-go trial. In this way, goal maintenance is the primary component associated with
attentional control (McVay & Kane, 2012). Thus, while competition resolution (e.g.,
suppressing inappropriate word meanings) may play a role in the relation between WMC
and reading comprehension, research suggests that attentional control is more heavily
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reliant on goal maintenance processes (Gernsbacher, 1993; Gernsbacher & Robertson,
1995; McVay & Kane, 2012). For example, research shows that readers who are lower in
attentional control are more prone to activating task-irrelevant representations in LTM
and mind wandering during reading than readers who with higher attentional control,
which negatively affects comprehension by drawing attention away from the goal of
understanding a text (Unworth et al., 2009; McVay & Kane, 2012). Further, inefficient
goal maintenance processes can affect situation model construction and inference
generation by initiating less-constrained searches of LTM during reading which, in turn,
can create interference with task-relevant thoughts (McVay & Kane, 2012). Thus,
attentional control could play a crucial role in facilitating readers’ ability to activate
predictive inferences during reading by promoting the goal maintenance processes that
allow readers to activate inference-related concepts in LTM while filtering out taskirrelevant thoughts.
To summarize, research has indicated that despite being helpful for
comprehension, predictive inferences are cognitively demanding and are not routinely
generated by all readers during text comprehension. Research has also suggested that the
right hemisphere is involved in facilitating predictive inferences and that hemispheric
activation of predictive inferences during reading varies as a function of textual
constraint. Further research has indicated that readers with high versus low WMC are
better able to activate predictive inferences during reading and that these differences are
reflected in differing patterns of hemispheric activation during predictive inference
generation. Research has also shown that levels of textual constraint can influence
patterns of inference generation in readers with high versus low WMC. Finally,
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attentional control has been identified as a crucial component of WMC that facilitates
goal maintenance processes during reading. Taken as a whole, these research findings
suggest that attentional control could play an important role in predictive inference
generation and that this role could provide a clearer picture of the processes that underlie
WMC-related variation in predictive inference generation in the hemispheres as a
function of textual constraint.
Rationale
Previous research has established that individual differences in WMC can
successfully predict variance in predictive inference generation during reading. Research
has also indicated that variance in the ability to generate predictive inferences is
manifested in the hemispheres and can be measured by varying the degree of textual
constraint in inference-related texts. Research supports the view that attentional control is
a crucial component of WMC that facilitates goal maintenance processes during reading.
However, the specific contribution of attentional control to predictive inference
generation in the hemispheres as a function of textual constraint has not been
investigated. Investigating this potential link could provide valuable information about
how an individual’s ability to sustain their attention during reading can affect their ability
to successfully predict what will happen next in a text. Thus, the present study
investigates the extent to which attentional control affects the speed and accuracy of
predictive inference generation in the hemispheres during reading and how this effect
varies as a function of textual constraint.
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Statement of Hypotheses
It is hypothesized that strongly constrained predictive inferences will be processed
faster than weakly constrained inferences in both hemispheres. With regard to attentional
control, it is predicted that a three-way interaction will occur; with higher levels of right
hemisphere facilitation occurring for weakly constrained predictive inferences in the low
attentional control condition than in the high attentional control condition.
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METHOD
Research Participants
78 undergraduate students (59 female, 19 male) at DePaul University participated
in the experiment in exchange for course credit. All participants were native speakers of
American English with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants were righthanded, as indicated by a score of 0.30 or greater on the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (mean laterality quotient = .84) (Oldfield, 1971).
Materials
Semantic Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART)
Before the inference task, participants were asked to complete the Semantic
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), taken directly from McVay and Kane
(2009). The Semantic SART is a go/no-go task in which subjects respond quickly with a
key press to all presented stimuli except infrequent (11%) targets. This version presents
words—other versions of the SART have used digits—for 300 ms followed by a 900 ms
mask. Most of the stimuli (non-target go trials) belonged to one category (e.g., animals)
while infrequent no-go targets belonged to another category (e.g., foods). Participants
were instructed to indicate, as quickly and accurately as possible (via a button press),
each time they saw a word that fit into the category of “animal” (e.g., giraffe) appear on
the screen but NOT when they saw a word that fit into the category of “food” (e.g.,
apple). After some of the target trials, participants had to complete a thought probe. This
short questionnaire asked them to indicate which item from a list of options best
described what they were just thinking about (e.g., “daydreaming”). The present study
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utilized a 20-minute version of the Semantic SART containing 540 trials, 60 targets, and
36 thought probes, which occurred after 60% of targets.
Semantic SART performance was measured based on response time variability.
Response time variability (RT variability) was calculated by taking the standard deviation
of a participant’s non-target, “go” trials (Jensen, 1992; McVay & Kane 2009, 2012). RT
variability has been shown to reflect attentional fluctuations over the course of the
Semantic SART task and has been correlated with WMC variation, frontal cortex
function, deficits in sustained attention, and rates of mind wandering (Bellgrove, Hester,
& Garavan, 2004; Johnson, Kelly, Bellgrove, Barry, Cox, Gill, & Robertson, 2007;
McVay & Kane, 2009). Unlike go/no-go accuracy scores, which can be subject to floor
and ceiling effects (e.g., near-ceiling accuracy on non-target “go” trials and/or less than
chance accuracy on “no-go” target trials), RT variability provides a simple and reliable
measure of a participant’s ability to sustain their attention on a task over time (McVay &
Kane, 2012). As it relates to goal maintenance—which research suggests is the primary
process by which attentional control contributes to WMC—RT variability provides a
measure of a reader’s ability to continually maintain the goal of the task (i.e., pressing the
space bar for non-target stimuli but not for target stimuli) while resisting interference
from task unrelated thoughts and environmental distractions. To distinguish low and high
attentional control readers, a median split was performed. After performing a median split
on participants’ Semantic SART RT variability scores, 39 participants were identified as
low attentional control readers (M = 155.54, SD = 42.15) and 39 participants were
identified as high attentional control readers (M = 91.48, SD = 17.32).
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Texts
The materials for the inference task consisted of three sets of 48 texts (inference,
neutral, and filler), taken from texts used in Virtue, van den Broek, and Linderholm
(2006). Texts consisted of four sentences, the last of which promoted a predictive
inference. For each constraint condition, the final sentence of the text was designed to
promote either a strongly or weakly constrained a predictive inference regarding the
scenario described in the previous three sentences. In the neutral and filler conditions, the
final sentence contained information that was designed not to promote a predictive
inference about the preceding sentences. Examples of predictive inference texts are
featured in Table 1.

Table 1. Example Predictive Inference Text (Taken from Virtue, van den Broek, and
Linderholm, 2006)
Inference Text
Tom and Krista were standing together holding hands.
Both of them were a little nervous, but mostly excited about today.
Tom imagined the future as he looked at Krista.
Strong textual constraint: They were just pronounced as man and wife.
Weak textual constraint: They were just announced as college graduates.
Target word: kiss
Neutral Text
The three women had been friends since childhood.
No matter where they were, they stayed in touch.

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

28

Currently, they were together to celebrate New Year’s Eve.
They spent the evening discussing old memories and talking about the future
Target word: kiss

Target Words
Each of the inference and neutral texts were followed by a target word that
corresponded with the inference invoked by the sentence. For example, in the text in
Table 1, the first three sentences of the passage provide the context for the reader to infer
that Tom and Krista will kiss. The fourth sentence in the passage was either strongly or
weakly related to target word (i.e., kiss). Neutral texts were paired with target words, but
the neutral texts did not promote the targeted inference. For example, the neutral text in
Table 1 should not cause a reader to activate the target word (i.e., kiss), as it does not fit
the context of the preceding sentences. Therefore, the neutral texts provided a baseline
for reaction times in each hemisphere. Target words in the present study were one or two
syllable action verbs and were similar in number of letters and frequency across
conditions. The filler texts did not promote these intended inferences and were paired
with non-word targets to keep participants from developing a positive response bias
(Neely, Keefe, & Ross, 1989). Data from the filler texts were excluded from the analyses
because it is extremely unlikely that a reader would activate a non-word in response to a
text.
Procedure
For the inference task, participants were asked to place their head in a chin rest
positioned 50 cm from a computer screen. This was done to ensure that each participant
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maintained a consistent distance and visual angle from the central fixation point for the
entirety of the experiment.
Participants were presented with an equal number of texts from the inference
(weakly and strongly constrained), neutral, and filler conditions on a PC using E-Prime
software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). The order and type of inference
texts were randomized using six between-subject counterbalancing conditions.
Participants only saw each text once in each version of the experiment. Participants read
each sentence at their own pace, one sentence at a time, as they appear on the computer
screen. Participants proceeded from one sentence to another using via a button press.
After reading the fourth and final sentence of each text, participants were instructed to
fixate on the center of a fixation plus (+) for the entire time (750 ms) that it appeared on
the computer screen.
Participants were then asked to perform a lexical decision task, during which they
had to decide (via button press), as quickly and as accurately as possible, whether a string
of letters (e.g., kiss) presented to either their right or left visual field for 176ms was a
word or a non-word. Targets words were presented approximately 3.5° to the left or right
of the fixation point at the center of the computer screen. Each participant was presented
with 144 texts (48 inference texts, 48 neutral texts, and 48 filler texts).
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RESULTS
Response time latencies and accuracy for the target words were analyzed. Only
correct responses were included in the analyses. To control for outlier effects, the top and
bottom 1% of response times were not included in the analyses. F1 refers to by-subject
analyses and F2 refers to by-item analyses.
Inference-Related Response Time Facilitation Effects
To test the first hypothesis that strongly constrained inferences would be
processed faster than weakly constrained inferences, a repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted on facilitation scores for mean inference response times in the strongly and
weakly constrained conditions in each visual field-hemisphere. Facilitation scores were
calculated by subtracting the inference condition response times from the neutral
condition response times in each visual field—hemisphere. The independent variables
were textual constraint (weak or strong) and visual field-hemisphere (right visual field—
left hemisphere or right visual field—left hemisphere). By participant analyses showed
no significant effect of sex, response hand, and counterbalancing condition, so these are
not reported.
Mean inference facilitation by constraint and visual field—hemisphere is
presented in Figure 1 (refer to Table 2 for mean response times by condition). There was
no main effect of visual field—hemisphere, F1 (1, 76) = 0.01, MSe = 115.25, p = .913; F2
(1, 47) = 0.02, MSe = 268.41, p = .88. There was a main effect of textual constraint, F1 (1,
76) = 26.95, MSe = 71,788.78, p < .05; F2 (1, 47) = 13.32, MSe = 53136.29, p < .05.
Results indicated greater facilitation for strongly constrained texts (M = 37.88, SE =
10.19) than for weakly constrained texts (M = 7.544, SE = 10.97).
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Two-tailed paired sample t-tests were conducted to test whether or not facilitation
scores differed significantly by condition in each visual field—hemisphere. In the rvfLH, strongly constrained texts showed greater facilitation than weakly constrained texts,
t1 (77) = -3.72, SE = 9.65, p < .05; t2 (47) = -2.77, SE = 14.71, p < .05. In the lvf-RH,
strongly constrained texts also showed greater facilitation than weakly constrained texts,
t1 (77) = -3.00, SE = 8.31, p < .05; t2 (47) = -2.25, SE = 11.47, p < .05. There was no
significant difference between strongly constrained inferences in the rvf-LH and lvf-RH,
t1 (77) = 0.33, SE = 12.75, p = 0.75; t2 (47) = 0.28, SE = 18.12, p = 0.78 and there was no
significant difference between weakly constrained inferences in the rvf-LH and lvf-RH, t1
(77) = -0.49, SE = 13.38, p = 0.62; t2 (47) = -0.52, SE = 19.06, p = 0.61. Thus, greater
facilitation was evident for strongly constrained than for weakly constrained inferences in
both hemispheres.
One sample t-tests were conducted to test whether or not facilitation differed
significantly from zero by condition in each visual field—hemisphere. Facilitation was
significantly greater than zero for strongly constrained inferences in the rvf-LH, t1 (77) =
3.99, SE = 10.01, p < .05; t2 (47) = 2.35, SE = 16.54, p < .05 as well as in the lvf-RH, t1
(77) = 3.45, SE = 10.37, p < .05; t2 (47) = 2.48, SE = 13.66, p < .05. Facilitation was not
significantly greater than zero for weakly constrained inferences in the rvf-LH, t1 (77) =
0.33, SE = 12.82, p = 0.74; t2 (47) = -0.13, SE = 14.43, p = 0.90 nor in the lvf-RH, t1 (77)
= 1.19, SE = 9.11, p = 0.24; t2 (47) = 0.55, SE = 14.53, p = 0.58. Thus, only responses in
the strongly constrained inference condition showed facilitation that differed significantly
from zero.

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

70

Weak Constraint

60

Average Facilitation (in ms)

32

Strong Constraint

50
40
30
20
10
0
rvf-LH

lvf-RH

-10
-20
-30

Figure 1. Average facilitation for strongly and weakly constrained predictive inference
by visual field—hemisphere. rvf-LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf-RH = left
visual field—right hemisphere.
Table 2. Mean Response Times (in ms) and Standard Errors for Strong, Weak, and
Neutral Textual Constraint Predictive Inference Texts by Visual Field—Hemisphere.
rvf-LH
Condition

lvf-RH

M

SE

M

SE

Strong Textual Constraint

397

14.87

412

15.10

Weak Textual Constraint

432

18.09

437

15.10

Neutral Textual Constraint

437

14.12

448

14.16

Note: rvf—LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf—RH = left visual field—
right hemisphere.
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Accuracy
To test for accuracy effects by condition (see Table 3 for mean accuracy
percentages by condition), a 3 (Textual Constraint: Strong, Weak, or Neutral) × 2 (Visual
Field—Hemisphere: rvf—LH or lvf—RH) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted.
There was no main effect of visual field—hemisphere, F1 (1, 77) = 0.01, MSe = .01, p =
.50; F2 (1, 47) = 0.31, MSe = .01, p = 0.58. There was a main effect of textual constraint,
F1 (1, 76) = 12.77, MSe = 0.16, p < .05; F2 (1, 47) = 5.88, MSe = 0.09, p < .05. There was
not a significant interaction between visual field—hemisphere and textual constraint F1
(1, 76) = 1.70, MSe = 0.01, p = 0.19; F2 (1, 47) = 0.63, MSe = 0.01, p = 0.54. Results
indicated higher accuracy for both strongly constrained texts and weakly constrained
texts than for neutral texts.
Table 3. Mean Accuracy Percentages and Standard Errors for Strong, Weak, and Neutral
Textual Constraint Predictive Inference Texts by Visual Field—Hemisphere.
rvf-LH

lvf-RH

Condition

M

SE

M

SE

Strong Textual Constraint

94

0.01

96

0.01

Weak Textual Constraint

93

0.01

94

0.01

Neutral Textual Constraint

90

0.02

88

0.02

Note: rvf—LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf—RH = left visual field—
right hemisphere.

Attentional Control Effects on Inference-Related Response Time Facilitation
To test the second hypothesis that attentional control would display a three-way
interaction along with textual constraint and visual field—hemisphere, a 2 (Attentional

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

34

Control: High or Low) × 2 (Textual Constraint: Strong or Weak) × 2 (Visual Field—
Hemisphere: rvf—LH or lvf—RH) mixed factors ANOVA was conducted (see Table 2
for mean response times by inference condition). Results indicated no significant three
way interaction between attentional control, textual constraint, and visual field—
hemisphere, F (1, 76) = 1.23, MSe = 4542.19, p = 0.27. However, follow-up contrasts
revealed that while the same pattern of significantly greater facilitation for strongly
constrained inferences than weakly constrained inferences in both visual field—
hemispheres was evident in the high attentional control group (see Figure 3, right panel)
for both the rvf-LH, t (38) = -2.34, SE = 11.22, p < .05 and the lvf-RH, t (38) = -3.36, SE
= 9.17, p < .05, in the low attentional control group (see Figure 3, left panel), facilitation
was only significantly greater for strongly constrained inferences than weakly constrained
inferences in the rvf-LH, t (38) = -2.87, SE = 15.71, p < .05 and not in the lvf-RH, t (38)
= -1.37, SE = 13.93, p = .18. Thus, facilitation for strongly constrained inferences was
greater than facilitation for weakly constrained inferences in both visual field—
hemispheres in the high attentional control group but this pattern was only evident in the
rvf-LH in the low attentional control group. One sample t-tests indicated that facilitation
for strongly constrained inferences in the high attentional control group (see Figure 3,
right panel) was significantly greater than zero in the rvf-LH, t (38) = 4.79, SE = 11.51, p
< .05 and in the lvf-RH, t (38) = 4.44, SE = 10.82, p < .05. Facilitation for weakly
constrained inferences in the high attentional control group was significantly greater than
zero for in the rvf-LH, t (38) = 2.30, SE = 12.55, p < .05 but not in the lvf-RH, t (38) =
1.44, SE = 11.92, p = 0.16. In the low attentional control group, facilitation for strongly
constrained inferences was not significantly greater than zero in the rvf-LH, t (38) = 1.53,
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SE = 16.17, p = 0.13 or in the lvf-RH, t (38) = 1.34, SE = 17.64, p = 0.19. Facilitation for
weakly constrained inferences in the low attentional control group was also not
significantly greater than zero in the rvf-LH, t (38) = -0.93, SE = 21.84, p = 0.36 or in the
lvf-RH, t (38) = 0.324, SE = 13.87, p = 0.75. Thus, the high attentional control group
showed significant facilitation for inferences in all conditions except for weakly
constrained inferences in the lvf-RH whereas the low attentional group did not show
significant facilitation for any of the conditions.

Average Facilitation (in ms)

60

Weak Constraint

70

Strong Constraint

60

50
40
30
20
10
0
-10

rvf-LH

lvf-RH

Average Facilitation (in ms)

70

Weak Constraint
Strong Constraint

50
40
30
20
10
0
-10

-20

-20

-30

-30

rvf-LH

lvf-RH

Figure 2. Average facilitation for strongly and weakly constrained predictive inferences
by visual field—hemisphere and attentional control. Facilitation for low attentional
control readers is shown on the left and facilitation for high attentional control readers is
shown on the right. rvf-LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf-RH = left visual
field—right hemisphere.

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

36

Table 4. Mean Response Times (in ms) and Standard Errors for Strong, Weak, and
Neutral Textual Constraint Predictive Inference Texts by Visual Field—Hemisphere for
Low and High Attentional Control Groups.
Attentional Control
Low
Condition

High

M

SE

M

SE

rvf-LH

413.33

24.59

380.85

16.67

lvf-RH

429.51

24.92

395.42

18.99

rvf-LH

458.47

29.90

407.15

19.93

lvf-RH

448.62

23.10

426.22

19.58

rvf-LH

438.08

20.13

436.03

20.08

lvf-RH

453.12

22.82

443.41

17.05

Strong Textual Constraint

Weak Textual Constraint

Neutral Textual Constraint

Note: rvf—LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf—RH = left visual field—right hemisphere.
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Table 5. Mean Accuracy Percentages and Standard Errors for Strong, Weak, and Neutral
Textual Constraint Predictive Inference Texts by Visual Field—Hemisphere for Low and
High Attentional Control Groups.
Attentional Control
Low
Condition

High

M

SE

M

SE

rvf-LH

94

0.01

93

0.01

lvf-RH

96

0.01

95

0.02

rvf-LH

95

0.02

91

0.02

lvf-RH

94

0.02

95

0.02

rvf-LH

90

0.03

91

0.02

lvf-RH

88

0.03

87

0.02

Strong Textual Constraint

Weak Textual Constraint

Neutral Textual Constraint

Note: rvf—LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf—RH = left visual field—right hemisphere.
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DISCUSSION
The results from this study show the effects of attentional control on predictive
inference generation in the hemispheres as a function of textual constraint. These findings
support the hypothesis that facilitation for strongly constrained inferences was greater
than for weakly constrained inferences in both hemispheres. This demonstrates the effect
of textual constraint on predictive inference generation in the hemispheres and is
consistent with findings from previous studies (Linderholm, 2002; Virtue et al., 2006).
Specifically, this pattern of results suggests that both cerebral hemispheres respond faster
to inference-related target words when they are preceded by passages that are strongly
related to the target word than passages that are weakly related to the target word.
The finding that, overall, only strongly constrained inferences showed significant
facilitation for inference-related targets in both hemispheres further supports the initial
hypothesis that strongly constrained inferences would show greater facilitation than
weakly constrained inferences in both hemispheres. However, these findings do not
replicate the results of Virtue et al. (2006) with regard to weakly constrained inferences.
Virtue and colleagues (2006) found significantly greater facilitation for weakly
constrained predictive inferences in the right hemisphere than in the left hemisphere.
These results did not indicate a significant processing advantage for predictive inferences
in the right hemisphere compared to the left hemisphere, nor did they show significant
facilitation for weakly constrained predictive inferences in either hemisphere. Further, the
observation of this pattern in both hemispheres does not support predictions based on the
Fine-Coarse Semantic Coding Theory that weakly constrained predictive inferences—
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which contained target words that were distantly related to the preceding passages—
would show greater activation in the right hemisphere than in the left hemisphere.
One potential explanation for this pattern of results is that the Semantic SART
task was administered before the inference task rather than afterward. By contrast, Virtue
et al. (2006) administered the R-Span working memory task after the inference task. This
may have had an effect on the patterns of hemispheric activation observed during the
inference task in this study. Previous studies have shown that the right-lateralized frontoparietal attentional network is less active after performing a psychomotor vigilance task
(PVT) than before the task (Lim, Wu, Wang, Detre, Dinges, & Rao, 2010). Further,
research has also suggested that the cerebral blood flow velocity (CBFV) in both the right
and left hemispheres can decline over time as participants perform a sustained attention
task (Shaw, Finomore, Warm, & Matthews, 2012). In this way, it is possible that
participants’ activation patterns were affected by fatigue due to sustained attention in the
Semantic SART task. Specifically with regard to low attentional control readers, it is
possible that attentional fatigue after performing the Semantic SART task could have led
to difficulties in performing the cognitively demanding task of predictive inference
generation and, consequently, less facilitation than might have been observed if the
inference task had been performed before the Semantic SART task. By contrast, the high
attentional control readers my have been more resistant to the effects of attentional
fatigue and, thus, may have had less difficulty in generating predictive inferences after
performing the Semantic SART task than low attentional control readers. This would
explain why, despite showing several similarities to the pattern of results observed in
Virtue et al. (2006) (i.e., greater facilitation for strongly than weakly constrained
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inferences, similar facilitation for strongly constrained inferences in the LH and RH, and
greater—albeit non-significant—facilitation for weakly constrained inferences in the RH
than in the LH) the results of this study were not more closely aligned with the results
from Virtue et al. (2006) and predictions made based on the Fine-Coarse Semantic
Coding Theory.
Another potential explanation for this difference can be found in the contrast
between the facilitation results for the high attentional control group versus the low
attentional control group. The high attentional control group showed significantly greater
facilitation for strongly constrained inferences than for weakly constrained inferences in
both hemispheres. Further, the high attentional control group showed significant
facilitation for all conditions except for weakly constrained inferences in the right
hemisphere. This suggests that readers with high attentional control activate word
meanings related to strongly constrained predictive inferences in both hemispheres, but
that they only activate meanings related to weakly constrained inferences in the left
hemisphere.
By contrast, readers with low attentional control only showed significantly greater
facilitation for strongly constrained inferences than for weakly constrained inferences in
the left hemisphere. Further, low attentional control readers did not show significant
facilitation for strongly or weakly constrained inferences in either hemisphere. These
results did not confirm the hypothesis that low attentional control readers would display
higher facilitation for weakly constrained inferences than high attentional control readers.
However, consistent with the Capacity Constrained Comprehension (CCC) theory, these
results suggest that readers with low attentional control do not possess enough available
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cognitive resources to facilitate either strongly or weakly constrained predictive
inferences (Just & Carpenter, 1992). These results also support the Minimalist
Hypothesis in that not all readers in this study appeared to routinely generate predictive
inferences during reading (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). However, the specific distinction
between attentional control and WMC as evidenced by the differences between the
results of this study and the results of Virtue et al. (2006) and other theories of
hemispheric inference processing (e.g., the Fine-Coarse Coding theory) is difficult to
determine solely based on these results. However, the Executive Attention view of WMC
does offer a potential explanation.
The Executive Attention view states that working memory capacity is comprised
of two primary mechanisms: goal maintenance (i.e., the ability to sustain attention on a
specific task or stimulus) and competition resolution (i.e., the ability to overcome
moment-by-moment interference from goal-irrelevant stimuli). Previous research has
suggested that attentional control is primarily associated with the goal maintenance
component of working memory (McVay & Kane, 2012). This is consistent with the
finding that high attentional control readers show greater facilitation for strongly
constrained (i.e., more likely) predictive inferences than for weakly constrained (i.e., less
likely) predictive inferences because strongly constrained inferences are more closely
related to the goal of comprehending a text (i.e., they are more immediately relevant to
the context of the sentence) than weakly constrained inferences. Further, the finding that
only high attentional control readers showed significant facilitation for weakly
constrained inferences suggests that, consistent with the Executive Attention view and
CCC theory, only readers with high attentional control had enough cognitive resources
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available to generate weakly constrained predictive inferences. By contrast, the readers
with low attentional control may not have had enough available resources to maintain the
goal of comprehension while reading the texts to generate strongly or weakly constrained
inferences about information in the texts. Thus, the difference between these findings and
the findings of Virtue et al. (2006) could be that while the low WMC readers from their
study were more likely to activate less likely (i.e., weakly constrained) inferences in the
right hemispheres, low attentional control readers did not possess enough available
resources generate any predictive inferences.
These findings suggest that readers with high attentional control are more likely
to generate predictive inferences during text comprehension than readers with low
attentional control. These results also highlight a distinction between predictive inference
generation in low working memory capacity readers versus low attentional control
readers in that low working memory capacity readers show right hemisphere facilitation
for weakly constrained inferences whereas low attention control readers do not (Virtue et
al., 2006). Predictive inference generation is a cognitively demanding task that requires
available working memory resources to generate predictions about what will happen next
in a text (Linderholm, 2002). Since predictive inferences contribute to reading
comprehension by promoting anticipation of future text events, causal connections
between text events, and improved situation model construction, these findings suggest
that readers with high attentional control may be better comprehenders than readers with
low attentional control (van den Broek, 1990; Fincher-Kiefer, 1993). These findings
differ from those of previous studies in that low attentional control readers appear to have
difficulty generating predictive inferences regardless of the level of constraint whereas
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previous studies have suggested that low WMC readers activate strongly constrained
inferences in both hemispheres and activate weakly constrained predictive inferences in
the right hemisphere (Virtue et al., 2006). This finding may suggest that attentional
control is an essential factor in the process of predictive inference generation. Future
studies should further examine the specific mechanisms that contribute to the differences
between low attentional control and low WMC readers. In sum, this study improves our
understanding of text comprehension by showing how attentional control contributes to
predictive inference generation during reading, how textual constraint can influence
predictive inference generation in readers with high versus low attentional control, how
attentional control contributes to working memory processes during predictive inference
generation, and how these processes are activated in the cerebral hemispheres during text
comprehension.

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

44

References
Allbritton, D. (2004). Strategic production of predictive inferences during
comprehension. Discourse Processes, 38, 309-322.
Asanowicz, D., Marzecova, A., Jaskowski, P., & Wolski, P. (2012). Hemispheric
asymmetry in the efficiency of attentional networks. Brain and Cognition, 79,
117-128.
Baddeley, A. D. (1983). Working memory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London, 302, 311-324.
Beeman, M. (1993). Semantic processing in the right hemisphere may contribute to
drawing inferences from discourse. Brain and Language, 44, 80-120.
Beeman, M., Bowden, E. M., & Gernsbacher, M. A. (2000). Right and left hemisphere
cooperation for drawing predictive and coherence inferences during normal story
comprehension. Brain and Language, 71, 310-336.
Beeman, M., Friedman, R. B., Grafman, J., Perez, E., Diamond, S., & Lindsay, M. B.
(1994). Summation priming and coarse semantic coding in the right hemisphere.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 6, 26-45.
Bellgrove, M. A., Hester, R., & Garavan, H. (2004). The functional neuroanatomical
correlates of response variability: Evidence from a response inhibition task.
Neuropsychologia, 42, 1910-1916.
Borella, E., Ludwig, C., Fagot, D., & De Ribaupierre, A. (2011). The effect of age and
individual differences in attentional control: A sample case using the Hayling test.
Archives of Gerontology and Geriatrics, 53, e75-e80.
Bourne, V. J. (2006). The divided visual field paradigm: Methodological considerations.

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

45

Laterality, 11, 373-393.
Braver, T. S., Gray, J. R., & Burgess, G. C. (2007). Explaining the many varieties of
working memory variation: Dual mechanisms of cognitive control. In A. R. A.
Conway, C. Jarrold, M. J. Kane, A. Miyake, & J. N. Towse (Eds.), Variation in
working memory (pp. 76-106). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Brownell, H. H., Potter, H. H., Bihrle, A. M. & Gardner, H. (1986). Inference deficits in
right brain-damaged patients. Brain & Language, 27, 310-321.
Burgess, C. & Simpson, G. B. (1988). Cerebral hemispheric mechanisms in the retrieval
of ambiguous word meanings. Brain & Language, 33, 86-103.
Calvo, M. G., Castillo, M. D., & Schmalhofer, F. (2006). Strategic influence on the time
course of predictive inferences in reading. Memory & Cognition, 34, 68-77.
Danckert, J. & Ferber, S. (2006). Revisiting unilateral neglect. Neuropsychologia, 44,
987-1006.
Daneman, M. & Carpenter, P. M. (1983). Working memory and language
comprehension: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin & Review, 3, 422-433.
Daneman, M. & Merikle, P.M. (1996). Working memory and comprehension: A metaanalysis. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3, 422-433.
Dixon, P., LeFevre, J., & Twilley, L. C. (1988). Word knowledge and working memory
as predictors of reading skill. Journal of Educational Psychology, 80, 465-472.
Engle, R. W., & Kane, M. J. (2004). Executive attention, working memory capacity, and
a two-factor theory of cognitive control. In strong. Ross (Ed.). The psychology of
learning and motivation, 44, 145-199.
Fan, J., McCandliss, B. D., Sommer, T., Raz, A., & Posner, M. I. (2002). Testing the

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

46

efficiency and independence of attentional networks. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 14, 340-347.
Fincher-Kiefer, R. (1993). The role of predictive inferences in situation model
construction. Discourse Processes, 16, 99-124.
Gernsbacher, M. A., & Robertson, R. R. W. (1995). Reading skill and suppression
revisited. Psychological Science, 6, 165-169
Giora, R. (1997). Understanding figurative and literal language: The graded salience
hypothesis. Cognitive Linguistics, 8, 183-206.
Graessar, A. C., Singer, M., & Trabasso, T. (1994). Constructing inferences during
narrative text comprehension. Psychological Review, 101, 371-395.
Greene, D. J., Barnea, A., Herzberg, K., Rassis, A., Neta, M., Raz, A., & Zaidel, E.
(2008). Measuring attention in the hemispheres: The lateralized attention network
test (LANT). Brain & Cognition, 66, 21-31.
Heilman, K. M. & Van Den Abell, T. (1979). Right hemispheric dominance for
mediating cerebral activation. Neuropsychologia, 17, 315-321.
Helton, W. S., Kern, R. P., & Walker, D. R. (2009). Conscious thought and the sustained
attention to response task. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 600-607.
Jin, H., Liu, H., Fang, S., Zhang, J., & Lin, C. (2009). Involvement of the left inferior
frontal gyrus in predictive inference making. International Journal of
Psychophysiology, 71, 142-148.
Johnson, K. A., Kelly, S. P., Bellgrove, M. A., Barry, E., Cox, M., Gill, M. & Roberston,
I. H. (2007). Response time variability in Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder: Evidence for neuropsychological heterogeneity. Neuropsychologia, 45,

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

47

630-638.
Just, M. A. & Carpenter, P. A. (1992). A capacity theory of comprehension: Individual
differences in working memory. Psychological Review, 99, 122-149.
Lehman-Blake, M. L. & Tompkins, C. A. (2001). Predictive inferencing in adults with
right hemisphere brain damage. Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing
Research, 44, 639-654.
Lehman-Blake, M. L. & Lesniewicz (2005). Contextual bias and predictive inferencing in
adults with and without right hemisphere brain damage. Aphasiology, 19, 423434.
Lim, J., Wu, W., Wang, J., Detre, J. A., Dinges, D. F., Rao, H. (2010). Imaging brain
fatigue from sustained mental workload: An ASL perfusion study of the time-ontask-effect. NeuroImage, 49, 3426-3435.
Linderholm, T. (2002). Predictive inference generation as a function of working memory
capacity and causal constraint. Discourse Processes, 34, 259-280.
Linderholm, T. & Van den Broek, P. (2002). The effects of reading purpose and working
memory capacity on the processing of expository text. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 94, 778-784.
Kane, M. J., Brown, L. H., McVay, J. C., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. R.
(2007). For whom the mind wanders, and when: An experience-sampling study of
working memory and executive control in daily life. Psychological Science, 18,
614-621.
Kintsch, W. (1988). The role of knowledge in discourse comprehension: A constructionintegration model. Psychological Review, 95, 163-182.

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

48

Klin, C. M., Murray, J. D., Levine, W. H., & Guzman, A. E. (1999). Forward inferences:
From activation to long-term memory. Discourse Processes, 27, 241-260.
Koivisto, M. (1998). Categorical priming in the cerebral hemispheres: Automatic in the
left hemisphere, postlexical in the right hemisphere? Neuropsychologia, 36, 661668.
Magliano, J. P., Graessar, A. C., & Trabasso, T. (1999). Strategic processing during
comprehension. Journal of Educational Psychology, 91, 615-629.
Manly, T., Lewis, G. H., Robertson, I. H., Watson, P. C., & Datta, A. K. (2002). Coffee
in the cornflakes: Time-of-day as a modulator of executive response control.
Neuropsychologia, 40, 1-6.
Manly, T., Robertson, I. H., Galloway, M., & Hawkins, K. (1999). The absent mind:
Further investigations of sustained attention to response. Neuropsychologia, 37,
661-670.
McVay, J. C. & Kane, M. J. (2009). Conducting the train of thought: Working memory
capacity, goal neglect, and mind wandering in an executive-control task. Journal
of Experimental Psychology, 35, 196-204.
McVay, J. C. & Kane, M. J. (2012). Why does working memory capacity predict
variation in reading comprehension? On the influence of mind wandering and
executive attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 302-320.
Miyake, A., Carpenter, P. A., & Just, M. A. (1994). A capacity approach to syntactic
comprehension disorders: making normal adults perform like aphasic patients.
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 11, 671-717.
Murray, J. D. & Burke, K. A. (2003). Activation and encoding of predictive inferences:

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

49

The role of reading skill. Discourse Processes, 35, 81-102.
Oldfield, R. C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: The Edinburgh
inventory. Neuropsychologia, 9, 97–113.
Schneider, W., Eschman, A., & Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-Prime users guide. Pittsburgh,
PA: Psychology Software Tools.
Shaw, T., Finomore, V., Warm, J., & Matthews, G. (2012). Effects of regular or irregular
event schedules on cerebral hemovelocity during a sustained attention task.
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 34, 57-66.
Singer, M. & Ritchot, K. F. M. (1996). The role of working memory capacity and
knowledge access in text inference processing. Memory & Cognition, 24, 733743.
Smallwood, J. (2011). Mind-wandering while reading: Attentional decoupling, mindless
reading and the cascade model of inattention. Language and Linguistics Compass,
5, 63-77.
Smallwood, J., Fishman, D. J., & Schooler, J. W. (2007). Counting the cost of an absent
mind: Mind wandering as an underrecognized influence on educational
performance. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14, 230-236.
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M., Luus, B., & Schooler, J. (2008). Segmenting the stream
of consciousness: The psychological correlates of temporal structures in the time
series data of a continuous performance task. Brain & Cognition, 66, 50-56.
Smallwood, J., Riby, L., Heim, D., & Davies, J. B. (2006). Encoding during the
attentional lapse: Accuracy of encoding during the semantic sustained attention to
response task. Consciousness & Cognition, 15, 218-231.

Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL

50

Unsworth, N. & Spillers, G. L. (2010). Working memory capacity: Attention control,
secondary memory, or both? A direct test of the dual component model. Journal
of Memory and Language, 62, 392-406.
van den Broek, P. (1990). The causal inference maker: Towards a process model of
inference generation in text comprehension. In D. A. Balota, G. B. Flores
d’Arcais, & K. Rayner (Eds.), Comprehension in reading (pp. 423-445).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
van den Broek, P. (1994). Comprehension and memory for narrative texts: Inferences and
coherence. In M.A. Gernsbahcer (Ed.), Handbook of Psycholinguistics (pp. 539588). San Diego, CA: Academic.
Virtue, S., Van den Broek, P., & Linderholm, T. (2006). Hemispheric processing of
inferences: The effects of textual constraint and working memory capacity.
Memory & Cognition, 34, 1342-1354.
Weingartner, K. M., Guzman, A. E., Levine, W. H., & Klin, C. M. (2003). When
throwing a vase has multiple consequences: Minimal encoding of predictive
inferences. Discourse Processes, 36, 131-146.
Zwaan, R. A., Magliano, J. P., Graesser, A. C. (1995). Dimensions of situation model
constructive during narrative comprehension. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 386-397.
Zwaan, R. A. & Radvansky, G. A. (1998). Situation models in language comprehension
and memory. Psychological Bulletin, 123, 162-185.

